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Judicial Review of State Regulation 
Which Impacts Foreign Trade: A Second Look a t  
South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke 
The paths followed by courts in resolving federal-state 
regulatory conflicts have led the nation through its history of 
federalism and have encircled the states' ability to intrude into 
areas of national interest. Judicial resolution of commercial 
regulatory conflicts between federal and state governments is 
ultimately a question of constitutional concern. Article I section 
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "[tlo regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States."' When Congress has acted within a field of foreign or 
interstate commerce, the Constitution leaves little doubt that 
the congressional action preempts state commercial regula- 
t i o n ~ . ~  
Courts are faced with a much more difficult problem, how- 
ever, in reviewing state commercial regulations in the face of 
congressional ina~t ion .~  When legislative history is slim or 
nonexistent, courts must predict the degree to  which Congress 
would have limited state power to regulate commerce.' In re- 
1. U.S. CONST. art.1, $ 8, cl. 3. 
2. U.S. CONST. art.VI, $ 2 .  
3. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Justice Stew- 
art explained: 
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate com- 
merce among the States, many subjects of potential federal regulation 
under that power inevitably escape congressional attention "because of 
their local charader and their number and diversity." In the absence of 
federal legislation, these subjects are open to control by the States so 
long as they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause 
itself. The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the 
Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this 
Court giving effect to its basic 
Id. at 623 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 
303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)) (citations omitted). 
4. Id. See also Thomas R. Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce 
Clause, in 3 A.A.L.S., SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 931-32 (1938). 
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sponse to congressional inaction, the courts have developed a 
self-executing rule of commerce known as the "dormant com- 
merce clause" which defaults to a presupposed congressional 
trade policy. Professors Hay and Rotunda explain that "[wlhen 
the Court seeks to decide the extent of permissible state regu- 
lation in light of a 'dormant' Commerce Clause power, it is, in 
effect, attempting to interpret the meaning of congressional si- 
lence when it intervenes in an area where the primary power is 
that of Congre~s."~ 
In reviewing state intrusions into areas of congressional 
silence, the courts have speculated that if Congress had acted, 
it would have eliminated the states' ability to burden interstate 
commerce. Under dormant commerce clause review, courts ask 
if a state's action unduly burdens interstate commerce without 
express authorization or without furthering a legitimate state 
interest? Thus, state actions favoring intrastate trade over 
interstate commerce are targets for dormant commerce clause 
invalidation. 
Differences between the national interests involved in in- 
terstate trade and those at  stake in foreign commerce present 
reasons to criticize the application of a dormant commerce 
clause analysis to state regulations which primarily impact 
foreign trade. The dormant commerce clause preference for 
unburdened trade is contrary to  many of the nation's foreign 
trade poli~ies.~ Furthermore, the fairness of the dormant com- 
merce clause rule diminishes when it  is applied to state actions 
which impact foreign trade. Under the rule, states are required 
to open their borders to foreign commerce without any assur- 
ance of reciprocal treatment from their foreign trading part- 
n e r ~ . ~  
In reviewing state regulations which primarily impact for- 
eign trade, courts should allow the states to exercise the full 
measure of the regulatory power reserved them by the Consti- 
tution. In other words, the states should be allowed to  regulate 
5. PETER HAY & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE UNFTED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM: 
LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 72 (1982). 
6. See Baldwin v. GAF.  Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). A state statute is 
invalid "when the avowed purpo& of the obstruction, as well as its necessary 
tendency, is to suppress or %gate the mnseqyences of competition between the 
states." Id. at 522. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40. 
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foreign commerce concurrently with the federal government to 
the extent that the action is not expressly prohibited by the 
Constitution or by Congress.' In order to preserve the external 
affairs power of the federal government, state regulatory power 
should be limited to actions which are not contradictory or re- 
pugnant to national foreign policy.1° Under the concurrent 
powers analysis, the validity of state commercial regulations 
would not depend upon the magnitude of its discriminatory 
effect. Rather, the regulation's validity would depend upon its 
consistency with United States foreign trade policy. 
11. APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. A Second Look at South-Central Timber Development 
v. Wunnicke 
The Supreme Court's decision in South-Central Timber 
Development v. Wunnickel1 illustrates the difficulties of apply- 
ing the dormant commerce clause to state commercial regula- 
tions which primarily impact foreign trade. The conflict before 
the Court in South-Central concerned the validity of an Alas- 
kan administrative reg~lation'~ which required all timber 
purchased from state lands to undergo primary pro~essing'~ 
within Alaska prior to export from the state.14 The require- 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 42-63. 
10. See infia text accompanying notes 64-70. 
11. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
12. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, $5 71.230, 71.910 (1982). 
13. The major method of complying with the primary-manufacture require- 
ment is to convert the logs into cants, which are logs slabbed on at least 
one side. In order to satisfy the Alaska requirement, cants must be either 
sawed to  a maximum thickness of 12 inches or squared on four sides 
along their entire length. 
South-Central, 467 U.S. at 85. 
14. Alaska is not alone in its attempt to regulate log exports. Oregon has 
adopted a Joint Senate Resolution which imposes similar restrictions on log exports 
from the State. The resolution was designed to recognize at least two things: 
(2) [Tlhe importance of maintaining employment in local mills and com- 
munity stability . . . . 
. . . .  
(8) When a state exports logs instead of lumber, it is functioning similar 
to the developing nations of the world that rely on their unprocessed 
natural resources as a primary means of generating foreign exchange 
revenue. By exporting raw material, we lose the value added by manu- 
facturing, the jobs involved directly . . . and the related spin-off 
jobs. . . . 
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ment was intended to proted the state lumber industry, in- 
crease revenues from the state's timber resources, and manage 
the state's forests.15 The regulation's effect was limited to con- 
tracts for timber taken from state lands and in no way inhibit- 
ed contracts for privately owned timber? 
The primary processing requirement was challenged17 by 
South-Central Timber Development, a logging company dealing 
almost exclusively with Japanese buyers .I8 South-Central 
challenged the regulation on the grounds that the requirement 
violated the "negative implications of the Commerce Cla~se."'~ 
The district court ruled in South-Central's favor and enjoined 
the state from enforcing the primary processing re- 
q~irernent.~' The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding implicit con- 
gressional authorization in a similar federal regulation2' that 
The resolution is to become "operative when federal law is enacted allowing this 
state to exercise such authority or when a court or the Attorney General of this 
state determines that such authority lawfully may be exercised." S.J. Res. 8, 65th 
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Or. Laws 2224. 
To date, Oregon has not received authorization to implement its resolution, but 
authorization from Congress may be forthcoming. In April of 1990, the "Senate 
passed an amendment to a trade bill offered by Senator Bob Packwood, Republican 
of Oregon, that would allow states to ban the export of logs. . . . A similar bill is 
before the House, and prospects appear good for Congressional passage? Timothy 
Egan, 10,000 Are Expected to Lose Jobs to Spotted Owl, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1990, 
0 1, at 8, col. 3. 
15. South-Central, 467 U.S. at 85. Since Alaska's motivation for adopting the 
primary processing requirement was to preserve an economic interest in its lumber 
industry, the state could not claim that its statute was a proper use of its police 
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens. See also infra text accom- 
panying note 39. 
16. For a discussion of the applicability of the commerce clause to state-owned 
natural resources see, Thomas K. Anson & P. M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TM. L. REV. 71 (1980) 
(explaining that state regulations designed to proted state-owned natural resources 
should be valid unless expressly invalidated by Congress). 
17. South-Central, 467 U.S. 82. The suit arose when South-Central learned that 
the Alaska Department of Natural Resources announced that it would sell 49 
million board feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape, Alaska on October 23, 1980 
and that the primary processing requirement would be part of the contract. Id. at  
84-87. 
18. Id. at 85 n.4. The majority noted that Alaska does not have an interstate 
timber trade. Practically all of its timber is sold abroad and at least 90% of the 
timber is exported to Japan. Id. 
19. Id. at 86 n.5. 
20. South-Central Timber Dev. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D. Alaska 
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., South-Central Timber 
Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
21. Unprocessed timber from National Forest System lands in Alaska may 
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requires primary processing of all timber taken from federal 
lands in Alaska? The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit's decision. The Court held that the parallel federal pri- 
mary processing requirement did not implicitly authorize Alas- 
ka to impose its own requirement on state owned timber.23 
The Court applied the dormant commerce clause and concluded 
that the regulation unduly burdened commerce and, thus, with- 
out express authorizationU from Congress, violated the nega- 
tive implications of the commerce clause? 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Foreign Trade 
The Court in South-Central failed to recognize that the 
dormant commerce clause is imbued with policies unique to 
domestic trade and should not be readily applied to matters of 
foreign commerce. The rule developed largely in response to 
individual state attempts to exploit trade among neighboring 
not be exported from the United States or shipped to other States with- 
out prior approval of the Regional Forester. This requirement is necessary 
to ensure the development and continued existence of adequate wood 
processing capacity in that State for the sustained utilization of timber 
from the National Forests which are geographically isolated from other 
processing facilities. 
36 C.F.R. 8 223.161 (1990) (in effect since 1928). 
The federal government has in the past sought to limit access to federally 
owned forests in a variety of ways. From 1969 to 1973, Congress imposed a maxi- 
mum export limitation of 350 million board-feet of unprocessed timber from federal 
lands lying west of the 100th meridian. See 16 U.S.C. 8 617(a) (1988). 
22. South-Central Timber Dev. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1982), 
rev'd sub mm., South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
23. South-Central, 467 U.S. at 87-93. 
24. The Supreme Court noted: 
On those occasions in which consent has been found, congressional 
intent and policy to insulate state legislation from Commerce Clause at- 
tack have been "expressly stated. . . ." There is no talismanic significance 
to the phrase "expressly stated" however; it merely states one way of 
meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from 
the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be 
unmistakably clear. 
Id. at  90-91 (citations omitted). 
25. Id. at 99-101. A plurality of the Court also rejected Alaska's contention that 
it merely imposed the primary processing requirement as a market participant and 
not in any regulatory capacity. The plurality reasoned that Alaska's conduct could 
not acceptably fall within the market participation exception to the commerce 
clause since the requirement imposed significant downstream effects on commerce. 
Id. at 93-99 (plurality opinion). 
276 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
states.26 In Hughes v. Oklahoma,2' the Supreme Court ex- 
plained that the commerce clause was designed "to avoid the ' 
tendencies toward economic Balkinization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under 
the Articles of Confederati~n."~~ 
The Court elsewhere explained another purpose of the 
commerce clause: 
"When the regulation is of such a character that its burden 
falls principally upon those without the state, legislative ac- 
tion is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints 
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects 
adversely some interests within the state." On the other hand, 
when Congress acts, all segments of the country are repre- 
sented, and there is significantly less danger that one State 
will be in a position to exploit others?' 
Thus the commerce clause allows Congress to promote econom- 
ic fairness by ensuring representation of local interests and by 
providing an even playing field that subjects all participants to 
the same rules of commerce.30 While this set of objectives res- 
onates well with our system of domestic trade and government, 
the realities of foreign trade policy require a distinction be- 
tween national and interstate borders. 
1. Harmony between federal and state trade regulations 
In South-Central, the Supreme Court required Alaska to  
export raw logs from state lands despite the long established 
federal primary processing requirement. In reaching its deci- 
sion, the plurality reasoned, "It is crucial to the efficient execu- 
tion of the Nation's foreign policy that 'the Federal Govern- 
ment . . . speak with one voice when regulating commercial 
relations with foreign governments.' "31 
The Court's decision created the opposite effect. Instead of 
26. See Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in 
REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 21 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 
1981). 
27. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
28. Id. at 325. 
29. South-Central, 467 U.S. at 92 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Dep't 
v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185, n.2 (1938)). 
30. See id. 
31. Id. at 100 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)) 
(plurality opinion). 
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presenting foreign buyers with a uniform log export policy, the 
Cour4t3s decision created a dual policy. Foreign buyers may 
now purchase raw logs from private and state-owned lands but 
only processed lumber from federal lands. This fragmented 
policy illustrates the weakness of the dormant commerce clause 
"as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to 
enact laws imposing substantial burdens on . . . commerce."32 
The Court's decision should not have rested solely upon the 
magnitude of the regulation's discriminatory effect on foreign 
trade. Rather, the Court could have reached a much more co- 
herent result had it reviewed the validity of Alaska's regulation 
on the basis of its consistency with federal regulations and 
foreign trade policies. 
2. International commerce and'fkee trade preferences 
For a variety of security and economic reasons, many 
Americans have welcomed governmental intervention into 
foreign import and export markets.33 Reflecting these senti- 
ments, the United States does not have an established prefer- 
ence for free international trade. Instead, Americans have ap- 
proached uninhibited international trade with a great deal of 
caution and concern. 
Dormant commerce clause analysis does not entertain 
these concerns but is instead biased in favor of free trade. Of- 
ten, national interests in noneconomic foreign policy shape 
foreign trade pol i~y?~ In this regard, even state regulations 
that facilitate foreign commerce can do damage to national for- 
32. Id. at 87. 
33. Arguments for governmental intervention in foreign commerce include the 
need for: 
1. protection against dumping practices, 
2. protection against foreign export subsidies, 
3. protection of infant industries, 
4. protection of domestic jobs, 
5. promotion of industry vital to  the national defense, 
6. improved terms of trade, 
7. diversification of domestic industry. 
ROY RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 458-65 (2nd ed. 
1985). 
34. See generally C ~ S  W. KEGLEY, JR. & EUGENE R. W~ITKOPF, WORLD 
POLITICS TREND AND TRANSFORMATION (1985) "[Llinkage concept meads] that the 
entire range of [foreign]-American relations [are] interdependent and that therefore 
concessions in any one problem area could and must be compensated for by rough- 
ly equivalent concessions in others." Id. at 58. 
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eign policies if the trading partner has been disfavored or if the 
traded goods are sensitive to vital security interests. For exarn- 
ple, in the summer of 1989, the efforts of Governor Guy Hunt 
to establish a trade agreement between Alabama and the 
Hubei Province in central China were threatened when Presi- 
dent Bush considered economic sanctions in response to the 
military suppression of Chinese  protestor^.'^ 
3. Fora and fairness 
Under the commerce clause, congressional power to act in 
regulating foreign and interstate trade to the exclusion of state 
regulatory power is clear and ~nquest ioned.~~ Though the 
states must subordinate to federal regulation, they are usually 
not left without a voice in the policy decisions that affect them. 
Local interests participate in congressional regulatory actions 
via their elected representatives, through whom they are able 
to exert a measure of influence upon national trade policy. The 
system of representation breaks down, however, when Congress 
does not act in a field of local concern. Congressional inaction 
forms an important dimension of national trade policy and 
often affects state interests as much as an affirmative intrusion 
into local  matter^.^' When Congress is silent, it implicitly re- 
jects active state participation in national policy-making. The 
federal government's exclusive power under the Constitution to  
negotiate and make treaties with foreign nations further limits 
the states' ability to  seek redress for alleged economic harm in 
international fora?' 
The dormant commerce clause also restricts the states' 
ability to represent their own economic interests in an alterna- 
tive judicial forum. Under the commerce clause, a state may 
regulate commerce without congressional authority when the 
action is a valid exercise of the state's police power.3g Howev- 
35. See Dana Beyerle, Alabama Adopts Wait, See Attitude on Beijing, UPI, June 
5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file. 
36. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 4. 
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 10. 
39. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US.  137 (1970) (stating that 
where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effeduate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effeds on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in rela- 
tion to the putative local benefits). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
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er, actions motivated primarily to protect state economic inter- 
ests are outside the state's police power and are invalid under 
the commerce clause. Consequently, states are effectively 
barred from judicial fora in protecting legitimate economic 
interests. 
Lack of state participation in all matters of domestic com- 
merce is not critical. When the dormant commerce clause is 
uniformly applied to  all states, the even application serves as a 
proxy for state participation in a national forum. In return for 
the restrictions placed on state freedom to exploit interstate 
trade, the commerce clause ensures each state protection from 
the opportunistic behavior of neighboring stated0 In this 
manner, interstate fairness is achieved not through a system of 
active state participation in national fora but rather through 
the uniform application of a domestic trade policy under the 
commerce clause. 
The commerce clause fails as an adequate proxy for state 
representation in matters touching foreign trade. When Con- 
gress is silent in areas sensitive to state economic interests, the 
states are left with neither active representation in national 
and international fora nor adequate protection. Though the 
dormant commerce clause prohibits state actions that unduly 
burden foreign commerce, it does not require foreign countries 
to reciprocate the benefits of unfettered trade extended by their 
state trading partners. 
Dormant commerce clause review of state actions that 
impact foreign trade may potentially extend the benefits and 
protections of the commerce clause to foreign trading partners 
at  the expense of legitimate state economic interests. It is 
doubtfd that the framers of the Constitution intended to sub- 
jugate valid state interests t o  those of foreign nations. 
Since the courts cannot ensure that foreign trading part- 
ners will treat the states fairly, the states should be allowed to 
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 
424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
40. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). The Court 
heid, "[Olne state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of 
economic isolation." Id. at 527. 
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exert the full measure of their regulatory powers reserved un- 
der the Constitution. Professor Kallenbach explains that the 
drafters of the commerce clause contemplated a system of con- 
current powers that would not wholly deprive states of the 
ability to influence commerce: 
So far as the commerce clause was concerned, there was 
nothing in the history of its adoption in the Convention that 
gave any clear indication that the framers regarded it as 
confemng an exclusive power on Congress. . . . In vesting 
control over interstate commerce in Congress the principal 
objective was the prevention of trade restraints, which, if 
permitted to continue, would disrupt the nation's internal 
commerce and lead to disunion. . . . 
. . . .  
The conclusion seems warranted that it was generally 
held by members of the Convention that the grant of the com- 
merce power to Congress did not in itself deprive the states of 
authority to legislate on matters relating to commerce, but 
that positive action by Congress under the grant was neces- 
sary to control such state legi~lation.~' 
Though the commerce clause provides a system of concur- 
rent powers between the federal and state governments, it fails 
to delineate clearly the scope of permissible state regulatory 
powers. Alexander Hamilton outlined three factors that would 
preclude the exercise of concurrent state regulatory power. He 
wrote: 
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete 
national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of 
the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would 
be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan 
of the [constitutionall convention aims only at  a partial union 
or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain 
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which 
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United 
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of 
State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the 
Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority 
to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to 
the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercis- 
41. JOSEPH E. KALLENBAcH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 10, 14 (1968) (citations omitted). 
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ing the like authority; and where it granted an authority to 
the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would 
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant .'2 
Hamilton's test for state concurrent power can be divided 
into two parts: a power prong and a scope prong. Under the 
power prong, states may exercise concurrent regulatory power 
with Congress unless the Constitution has granted Congress 
exclusive power or unless the Constitution prohibits concurrent 
state power in a regulatory field. Under the scope prong, state 
regulatory powers are limited to actions that are neither repug- 
nant nor contradictory to congressional authority. 
A. Power Prong 
I .  Express terms 
Under Hamilton's test, the states are precluded from exer- 
cising commercial regulatory powers if the Constitution grants 
exclusive regulatory powers to the federal government. Article I 
of the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate inter- 
state and foreign trade but stops short of excluding the states 
from exerting similar powers. As the Supreme Court pointed 
out in Goldstein v. Calif0rnia,4~ the mere grant of power to 
Congress by the Constitution is not itself enough to deprive the 
states of concurrent powers. In Goldstein, the Court upheld a 
California statute that provided state copyright protection to  
sound recordings." The Court concluded that Article I does 
not grant Congress the exclusive power to  establish copyright 
law? 
In limited settings, the Supreme Court has historically 
recognized state authority to regulate commerce. In Gibbons v. 
Ogden,'s the Court explained that states enjoy a limited scope 
of power but stopped short of denying states any concurrent 
powers.'" Later, in Cooky v. Board of Wardensf the Court 
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright 
ed., 1961) (emphasis added). 
43. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 552-61 (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, does not expressly or by 
inference vest all power to grant copyright protection exclusively in the Federal 
Government). 
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
47. Id. (limiting the states to the exercise of their police power in regulating 
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affirmed that the "mere grant to Congress of the power to regu- 
late commerce, did not deprive the States of the power to regu- 
late pilots" of ships bound for foreign ports.'g There, the Court 
preserved concurrent state regulatory powers by adopting a 
rule of "selective exclusiveness" which focused upon the subject 
matter of the challenged regulation rather than the nature of 
the exercised power.50 The Court distinguished between sub- 
jects of commerce that require uniform treatment and subjects 
of local interest warranting a diversity of treatment? Under 
the Cooley rule, Congress has exclusive power over subjects 
which require uniform treatment but only concurrent power 
with the states over matters of local interest.52 
Though the Cooky doctrine presented an appealing dichot- 
omy between local and national interests, the rule proved to be 
unworkable. Some doubt existed that courts could properly 
distinguish between matters of local and national interest as 
well as a fear that state regulation of local concerns would lead 
to commercial discrimination among the states.53 To date, the 
Supreme Court has not overruled Cooky, but "it has exhibited 
a tendency to rely less frequently upon the local-concurrent- 
powers concept and more upon a broader view of state police 
and revenue powers as a basis for upholding state acts relating 
to interstate and foreign commer~e."~ 
commerce); see also supra text accompanying note 34. 
48. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
49. Id. at 320. 
50. Id. at 318-21. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. Attorney General Wirt ibst proposed this rule in Gibbons when he 
argued: ' 
Some subjects are, in their nature, extremely multifarious and com- 
plex. The same subject may consist of a great variety of branches, each 
extending itself into remote, minute and infiite ramifications. One branch 
alone, of such a subject, might be given exclusively to Congress, yet, on 
other branches of the same subject, the States might act, without interfer- 
ing with the power exclusively granted to Congress. Commerce is such a 
subject. It is so complex, multifarious and indefinite that it would be 
extremely dieticult, if not impracticable, to make a digest of all the opera- 
tions which belong to it. One or more branches of this subject might be 
given exclusively to Congress; the others may be left open to the States. 
They may, therefore, legislate on commerce, though they cannot touch 
that branch which is given exclusively to Congress. 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 165. 
53. See HAY & ROTUNDA, supm note 5, at 82. 
54. KALLENBACH, supra note 41, at 45. 
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2. Granted and prohibited powers 
Hamilton noted that a power reserved for the states in one 
part of the Constitution could be limited or denied by other 
sections of the Con~titution.6~ Article I, Section 10 is a prorni- 
nent example of a constitutional limitation on the powers of 
states to deal with foreign trading partners. The section pro- 
vides, in part, that "[nlo State shall enter into any Treaty, 
Alliance, or Confederation," or "without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or E ~ p o r t s . " ~ ~  
The external affairs power is perhaps the broadest limita- 
tion on the states' power to influence their relationships with 
foreign trading partners. The Supreme Court explained that 
"[plower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is 
vested in the national government excl~sively."~' 
Di Santo v. P e n n s y l ~ a n i a ~ ~  is one of the first Supreme 
Court cases to hold that state attempts to influence foreign 
commerce were per se violations of the federal external affairs 
power." Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Di Santo has 
done much to soften the majority's rigid approach to state in- 
trusions into foreign commerce.60 In his opinion, Justice Stone 
reminded the majority that "the purpose of the commerce 
clause was not to preclude all state regulation of commerce 
crossing state lines, but to prevent discrimination and the erec- 
tion of barriers or obstacles to the free flow of commerce, inter- 
state or foreign? 
Relying on Stone's dissenting opinion, Professor Dowling 
later wrote that "the dormant commerce clause's unreasonable 
burden test implicitly requires application of the Cooley doc- 
trine, i.e., deliberately balancing national and local interests 
and making a choice as to which should prevail."62 Accord- 
55. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
56. U.S. CON=. art. I, 8 10. 
57. United States v. Pink, 315 US. 203, 233 (1942). See also Michelin Tire 
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). 
58. 273 U.S. 34 (1927), overruled by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 
(1940). 
59. Id. at 37. 
60. Cf. JOHN E. NOW& ET AL., C O N S T ~ I O N A L  AW 274 (2d ed. 1983). 
61. Di Santo v. Pe~sylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
62. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 
21 (1940). 
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ingly, the external affairs interest at  stake in foreign commerce 
should not form the basis of absolute preemption of state regu- 
lations that impact foreign trade. Rather, courts should consid- 
er the external affairs interest as one factor, inter aliu, limiting 
the permissible scope of state regulatory powers.63 
B. Scope Prong 
Hamilton explained that states should be given the ability 
t o  regulate commerce to the extent that the state exercise of 
power is not "absolutely and totally contradictory and repug- 
nant" to a power granted the union." Limiting the scope of 
state power in this manner allows the states to exercise the full 
measure of their regulatory powers without hampering the 
supremacy of the federal government in controlling interstate 
and foreign trade. Hamilton's Ucontradictory and repugnant" 
test has been judicially developed under the Supremacy Clause 
of the Con~titution.~~ 
The purpose of Supremacy Clause analysis is to prohibit 
individual states from frustrating the exercise of congressional 
power.66 Under the Supremacy Clause, a state's exercise of 
regulatory power is void if it "collides" with a federal exercise of 
power." The Supreme Court explained in Goldstein that care 
must be given "to distinguish those situations in which the 
concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and 
the States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts 
and those situations where conflicts will necessarily arise."68 
A court may also invalidate state actions if it finds evi- 
dence of congressional intent to "occupy the field of regula- 
63. cf NoWAK ET AL., supra note 60 at 274-275. 
64. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 42 at 261. 
65. US. C o ~ s r .  art. VI, 0 2. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not- 
withstanding. 
Id. 
66. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
67. Id. 
68. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (emphasis in original). 
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t i~n . "~  Typically, courts will not find congressional intent to  
occupy a field of regulation unless Congress has clearly ex- 
pressed its intention to abrogate state regulation of the field or 
unless the court. can imply that intention from a pervasive 
congressional regulatory scheme." Accordingly, the scope of 
state regulatory powers should be limited to avoid conflicts 
with existing legislation and collisions with Congress' external 
affairs powers. 
IV. ADVANTAGES OF LIMITED CONCURRENT S ATE POWERS 
The dormant commerce clause was developed to  interpret 
congressional silence in matters concerning domestic trade. 
However, foreign trade issues are often complex and involve a 
variety of noneconomic policy considerations. Concurrent pow- 
ers analysis allows the courts to base their decisions firmly 
upon a review of all relevant local and national concerns. 
As illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in South- 
Central, strict application of the dormant commerce clause can 
diminish rather than enhance the uniformity of national trade 
policy. The dormant commerce clause blinded the Court to the 
fact that Congress had an established primary processing re- 
quirement for all logs taken from federal lands. In striking 
down Alaska's primary processing requirement, the Court gave 
more deference to its own judicially created free trade policy 
than to a national policy that had sought for several years to 
protect both the local processing industry and the nation's 
timber supply. 
The dormant commerce clause favors free trade to the 
exclusion of many important policy concerns. Congress has 
historically acted to  preserve local industries through protective 
trade practices. This protection has often been justified by the 
need to preserve industries vital to national defense, protect 
jobs, and promote fairness by retaliating against foreign export 
subsidies and d~mping.'~ Furthermore, the United States' 
trade policy is often inexorably linked to diplomatic concerns 
that place foreign trading partners in a disfavored status.72 
69. See generally Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
70. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519 (1977); Northern Natural 
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963). 
71. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 33. 
72. See KEGLEY & WITTKOPF, supra note 34. 
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The concurrent powers analysis allows courts to consider the 
validity of state actions on the basis of their consistency with 
national trade and foreign policy. 
Concurrent powers analysis further provides a state with 
representation in a judicial forum in two instances: first, when 
congressional silence implicitly bars active representation in 
Congress and, second, when the commerce clause fails t o  pro- 
tect the state from its foreign trading partner. The commerce 
clause limits state power over foreign commerce to the exercise 
of its police power. The broader concurrent powers analysis 
allows the states to regulate beyond their police power as long 
as the Constitution does not prohibit state action or the state 
action does not collide with congressional regulations or poli- 
cies. Under this broader scope of review, a state is allowed to 
admit that its regulatory efforts are aimed at protecting local 
economic interests. However, the states carry the burden of 
showing that their actions are consistent with an existing con- 
gressional regulatory scheme. The advantages provided by 
broader state powers ensure that states will not be forced to 
extend the benefits of free trade to foreign trading partners 
without promise of reciprocity or adequate representation in a 
decision-making forum. 
V. APPLICATION OF CONCURRENT POWERS ANALYSIS TO 
South-Central 
The concurrent powers analysis would have allowed the 
Court in South-Central to travel a more favorable path in re- 
viewing Alaska's log export policy. Unburdened by the dormant 
commerce clause, the Court could have considered the validity 
of Alaska's regulation in light of all policy concerns and could 
have effectively balanced the state's interest in preserving its 
local lumber industry with the federal interest in maintaining 
a uniform national trade policy. 
The first step in reviewing Alaska's primary processing 
requirement under the concurrent powers analysis requires the 
state to  establish that the regulation's burden falls primarily 
upon foreign trading partners. Alaska could have easily met 
the foreign commerce requirement. The Court in South-Central 
pointed out that Alaska does not have an interstate timber 
trade. Almost all of Alaska's timber is exported abroad and at 
2711 SOUTH-CENTRQL TIMBER DEK V. FVUNNICKE 287 
least ninety percent of the timber is exported to  Japan.73 
A court might invalidate Alaska's regulation if it found the 
requirement "repugnant" to a national interest. The Goldstein 
Court explained that state regulations are repugnant when 
they attempt to exercise powers which Congress has reserved 
exclusively for itself or when the state's exercise of power will 
neces sari1 y conflict with congressional power or policy." The 
Court in South-Central described Alaska's regulation as "paral- 
lel" with the federal requirement. The state requirement was 
no more stringent than the long established federal practice. 
The consistency between the two regulations suggests that it is 
unlikely that a court would find a necessary collision between 
the federal and state regulations. 
A court applying the concurrent powers analysis to  the 
facts of South-Central would next have to determine whether 
Congress had intended to  occupy the field of log export regula- 
tion. The federal primary processing requirement is silent as t o  
Congress' intent to  regulate timber from nonfederal lands.75 
Since the congressional regulation was limited t o  timber taken 
from federal lands and in no way controlled timber exports 
from state and private lands, it is doubtful that a court would 
find congressional intent to occupy the entire field of log ex- 
ports. 
The facts of South-Central do not imply a collision with the 
federal government's external affairs powers. The consistency 
of the Alaskan administrative rule with the federal rule would 
allow a reviewing court to conclude that Alaska's regulation 
enhances rather than diminishes the uniformity of federal 
timber policy in the Northwest. Application of the concurrent 
powers test to the facts of South-Central reveals that a court 
could reasonably overturn the majority's decision without injur- 
ing the federal interest in a uniform trade policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The growing importance of foreign trade to individual state 
economies increases the likelihood that the states will inter- 
vene to  obtain favorable terms of trade and to  protect local 
economic interests. States' attempts to regulate their own com- 
73. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 85 n.4 (1984). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68. 
75. See 36 C.F.R. 5 223.161 (1990). 
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mercial activities with foreign trading partners will call upon 
the courts to redefine the relationship between federal and 
state government. The path that courts choose in reviewing 
state actions which impact foreign commerce will not only af- 
fect the future of federalism in the United States but will also 
demarcate the states' ability to maximize the benefits of foreign 
trade. The dormant commerce clause offers courts a narrow 
course of review and is ill-suited to encompass the complexities 
of foreign trade. Alternatively, the concurrent powers test 
clears the path by allowing the courts to consider all local and 
national concerns in reviewing state commercial regulations 
which impact foreign trade. 
York Moody Faulkner 
